The charge of the Light Brigade is one of Britain's best-known glorious military disasters. On 25 October 1854, during the siege of Sebastopol, the Light Brigade attacked Russian gun positions at Balaclava. The charge lasted 7 minutes; of 673 officers and men who went into action, 247 men and 497 horses were lost. This book shatters many long-held conceptions of how and why it happened, and who was to blame. Mark Adkin, a former professional soldier, has combined military expertise and detailed research of participants' accounts with a careful examination of the actual ground. His story switches carefully from the strategic and tactical problems of the battlefield to what it was like for the trooper riding down the valley or a Russian gunner serving his cannon. Through the novel use of sketches the reader can, at every stage, look down on the battlefield from the same position as that used by the British commander-in-chief, Lord Raglan. He sees the situation as Raglan saw it when he gave his order that launched the Brigade down the valley of death. Raglan gave the order, Captain Nolan delivered it, Lord Lucan received it, and the Earl of Cardigan executed it. History has disagreed over the share of the blame. This book makes a masterly analysis of the probabilities and discusses factors previously overlooked. There is a cogent argument, never made before, that the blunder was deliberate. The result is a gripping and definitive study of a debacle that has never ceased to enthral the imagination.
The charge of the Light Brigade is one of Britain's best-known glorious military disasters. On 25 October 1854, during the siege of Sebastopol, the Light Brigade attacked Russian gun positions at Balaclava. The charge lasted 7 and 1/2 minutes; of 673 officers and men who went into action, 247 men and 497 horses were lost. This book shatters many long-held conceptions of how and why it happened, and who was to blame. Mark Adkin, a former professional soldier, has combined military expertise and detailed research of participants' accounts with a careful examination of the actual ground. The result is a gripping and definitive study of a debacle that has never ceased to entral the imagination.
In the history of warfare, an elite group of men have attained almost legendary status through their courage, ambition and unrivalled military genius. But many of these same men possessed deep personal character flaws. In Heroes & Villains, acclaimed historian Frank McLynn focuses on six of the most powerful and magnetic leaders of all time: Spartacus, Attila the Hun, Richard the Lionheart, Cortés, Tokugawa Ieyasu and Napoleon. How did these mortal men rise to positions of seemingly invincible power? What were the motives, the personal strengths and often weaknesses that drove them to achieve what no one else dared?
In six powerful portraits, McLynn brilliantly evokes the critical moments when each of these warriors proved themselves in battle, changing their own lives, the destiny of their people and, in some cases, the history of the world. We discover what drove Spartacus to take on the might of Rome against seemingly impossible odds, and how the young Napoleon rose to power in dramatic fashion at the Siege of Toulon.
Heroes & Villains is more than a collection of individual biographies. By examining the complex psychologies of these extraordinary men, McLynn builds up a convincing profile of the ultimate warrior. Accompanying a major BBC television series, this brilliant book takes us into the minds of the greatest warriors in history.
In late June 1942, the dispirited and defeated British Eighth Army was pouring back towards the tiny railway halt of El Alamein in the western desert of Egypt. Tobruk had fallen and Eighth Army had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Rommel's Panzerarmee Afrika. Yet just five months later, the famous bombardment opened the Eighth Army's own offensive which destroyed the Axis threat to Egypt. Explanations for the remarkable change of fortune have generally been sought in the abrasive personality of the new army commander Lieutenant-General Bernard Law Montgomery. But as Niall Barr shows in this new interpretation, based on extensive original research, the long running controversies surrounding the commanders of Eighth Army - Generals Auchinleck and Montgomery - and that of their legendary opponent, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, have often been allowed to obscure the true nature of the Alamein campaign. This book is the story of how an army learnt from its mistakes. The focus on personality has blurred the continuity of experience that saw the Eighth Army transform itself from a tactically inept collection of units into a battle-winning force. Pendulum of War explores how the Eighth Army learnt from bitter experience to develop tactical and operational methods that eventually mastered the veterans of Rommel's Afrika Korps and provides a vivid and fresh perspective on the fighting at El Alamein from the early desperate days of July to the final costly victory in November.
In late June 1942, the dispirited and defeated British Eighth Army was pouring back towards the tiny railway halt of el Alamein in the western desert of Egypt. Tobruk had fallen and Eighth Army had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Rommel's Panzerarmee Afrika. Yet just five months later, the famous opening bombardment signalled the start of Eighth Army's own offensive which destroyed the Axis threat to Egypt. Explanations for the remarkable change in the fortunes of Britain's desert army have generally been sought in the abrasive personality of the new army commander Lieutenant-General Bernard Law Montgomery. But as Niall Barr argues in this fresh account, the long running controversies surrounding the commanders of Eighth Army - Generals Auchinleck and Montgomery - and that of their legendary opponent, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, have often been allowed to obscure the true nature of the Alamein campaign. Based on extensive original research, Pendulum of War looks beyond these arguments to provide a vivid picture of the fighting at Alamein from the early desperate days of July to the final costly victory in November. This is also the story of how an army learnt from its mistakes. For too long the change in personalities at the top has blurred the real continuity of experience that saw the Eighth Army transform itself from a tactically inept collection of units into a battle-winning army. Pendulum of War explores the Eighth Army's 'learning curve', and shows how lessons from bitter experience were used to develop improved tactical methods that eventually mastered the veterans of Rommel's Afrika Korps.